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Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as wage leader is a common 
form of wage bargaining in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such 
bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model all forms of pattern bargaining give the 
same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under monetary union 
wage leadership for the non-tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage 
leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking may lead the follower to set the 
same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector 
and promote high employment. 
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The wage-setting arrangements of many Western European countries are characterised by pattern
bargaining. This means that a key sector, usually the engineering sector, concludes the ￿rst agree-
ment in a wage bargaining round and that this agreement sets a norm for subsequent wage contracts
in other sectors. Pattern bargaining thus works as a coordination device. Typical examples are
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden (EEAG 2004).
It is usually believed that wage moderation is promoted by choosing a tradables sector, heavily
exposed to international competition, as wage leader. The gradual decline in the relative importance
of the manufacturing (tradables) sector and the associated rise of the services (non-tradables) sector
has, however, put the earlier system under strain in many countries.
Sweden provides a good example of both earlier thinking and the current problems for pattern
bargaining. Since the conclusion in 1997 of a framework agreement on how wage bargaining should
be conducted (the Industry Agreement), it has been generally accepted that the manufacturing
sector should act as a wage leader, setting the norm for wage increases in all industry-level wage
contracts.1 This principle has also been written into the instruction of the National Mediation
O¢ ce. The thinking goes back to the normative "Scandinavian model of wage formation" from
the early 1970s, according to which wage increases should follow the room given by price and
productivity increases in the tradables sector.2 In the ￿xed exchange-rate system of the time, this
norm was supposed to discipline wage setting, as ￿rms in the tradables sector would have to adjust
their prices to those of foreign competitors if they were to maintain their market shares. Hence,
wage setters would realise that higher wage increases than according to the norm would reduce the
pro￿t share in the tradables sector and cause unemployment. The belief was that the incentives for
wage moderation would be much weaker under uncoordinated bargaining or if the non-tradables
sector instead would set the norm, as the possibilities to shift wage increases on to prices are much
greater there.
Recently, the wage leadership role of the manufacturing sector has been questioned in Sweden.
1 See, for example, L￿nebildning f￿r full syssels￿ttning (1999), God sed vid l￿nebildning (2006) or Medlingsinsti-
tutet (2006).
2 The Scandinavian model of wage formation was originally formulated as a basis for wage bargaining in Norway;
see Aukrust (1972). The Swedish version was termed the EFO model; see Edgren, FaxØn and Odhner (1973). An
early analysis of the model was provided by Calmfors (1977).
1There has been widespread discontent on the part of both service sector employers and unions with
the wage leadership role of the manufacturing sector: they argue that it forces them to adjust to an
inappropriate wage norm that does not duly take their interests into account. Similar discussions
have taken place in other European countries, too, particularly Germany.
There is little previous academic research on the consequences of di⁄erent choices of wage
leader. Our aim is to ￿ll this gap. A key issue is how the e⁄ects are in￿ uenced by the monetary
regime: a ￿ exible exchange rate with in￿ ation targeting or membership in a monetary union (an
irrevocably ￿xed exchange rate). Another aim is to explain why negotiated wage increases in
subsequent bargaining tend to follow the key sector wage agreement very closely. We also examine
the assertion sometimes made that the key sector agreement provides a "￿ oor" for subsequent
agreements. A ￿nal issue is how the e⁄ects of choosing a sector as wage leader are a⁄ected by its
size. Our analysis is a follow-up to Calmfors (2008), who discussed pattern bargaining in Sweden
in an informal way.
We present a two-sector model of a small open economy. Pattern bargaining is modelled as
a Stackelberg game where either the tradables or the non-tradables sector is wage leader. Unco-
ordinated bargaining is modelled as a Nash equilibrium. We consider ￿rst a case with standard
trade union utility functions. This analysis gives a few unexpected results. It turns out that the
monetary regime is crucial for the e⁄ects of wage leadership. Under in￿ ation targeting, the two
Stackelberg equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibrium. Pattern bargaining thus provides iden-
tical outcomes to uncoordinated bargaining and it does not matter which sector is wage leader. In
monetary union, the real wage in the follower sector is the same under pattern bargaining as under
uncoordinated bargaining. If the tradables sector is leader in a Stackelberg game, it sets a higher
wage than in the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the non-tradables sector sets a lower wage when
it is wage leader in a Stackelberg game than in the Nash game. As a consequence, with pattern
bargaining aggregate employment is higher with the non-tradables sector than with the tradables
sector as wage leader. This result goes against the conventional wisdom, according to which wage
leadership for the tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high employment.
We also analyse a case where trade union utility in the follower sector depends on a reference
wage, which is taken to be the leader￿ s wage. The idea is to capture the tendency to use the
2bargained wage in the key sector as the comparison norm in subsequent bargaining in other sectors.
This analysis provides an explanation of the strong tendency for pattern bargaining to result in
more or less identical wage outcomes in di⁄erent sectors. Using the Kahneman-Tversky (1979)
concept of loss aversion, we show the possibility of corner solutions where it is optimal for the
follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such corner solutions can arise under both monetary
regimes when the smaller sector is wage leader. The leader may then have an incentive to act
strategically to induce the follower to choose such an equilibrium. We show that "comparison
thinking" in combination with loss aversion may promote wage restraint and high employment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews related literature. The model
assumptions regarding output, employment, prices and monetary policy are presented in Section
3. Section 4 analyses wage setting assuming standard trade union utility functions. Section 5
considers the case where the leader determines a wage norm that in￿ uences union utility in the
follower sector. Section 6 provides numerical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
A recent literature has suggested that the conventional result of the neutrality of money does not
necessarily obtain in the presence of large wage setters. The reason is that when trade unions are
large enough to internalise the impact of their wage decisions on aggregate variables, the potential
response of the central bank will a⁄ect wage and employment outcomes.
The literature on wage setting and monetary regimes can be divided into two strands. In the
￿rst strand, in￿ ation-averse trade unions have an incentive to set low wages to avoid that a time-
inconsistent liberal central bank will in￿ ate as in Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Coricelli et al.
(2006). In the second strand, a conservative central bank provides a deterrent to wage increases by
threatening to pursue contractionary policy in response to wage hikes (Soskice and Iversen, 2000,
Corricelli et al., 2006).3
Although most of the literature considers closed economies, exceptions include Vartiainen (2002)
and Holden (2003), who compare in￿ ation targeting under a ￿ exible exchange rate with a ￿xed
exchange-rate regime in a two-sector model of a small open economy. These papers show that in
3 See also Calmfors (2004) for a review of this literature.
3the tradables sector, the real wage is higher under in￿ ation targeting than under a ￿xed exchange
rate, while the reverse applies in the non-tradables sector. Under rather general assumptions,
employment and welfare are higher under in￿ ation targeting than under a ￿xed exchange rate.4
The models discussed assume that wages in di⁄erent parts of the economy are set simultaneously
and thus independently of each other (Nash equilibrium). Our contribution is to analyse also
Stackelberg games where one sector acts as wage leader and the other as wage follower and to
compare these equilibria to the Nash equilibrium. The closest counterpart to our paper is Vartiainen
(2010), who analyses how Stackelberg leadership in general may be bene￿cial for employment, but
not the consequences of di⁄erent choices of wage leader.
3 The model
Consider a small open economy consisting of a tradables (T) and a non-tradables (N) sector, where
subscript i = N;T indicates sector. Each sector is made up of a continuum of identical perfectly
competitive ￿rms. The ￿rms in each sector are indexed on the interval [0,1]. The economy is
inhabited by a large number of households with identical utility functions and which consume the
two goods. Households consist of two groups: one group provides labour to ￿rms, the other group
is made up of "capitalists" owning the ￿rms. The nominal wage in each sector is set through
bargaining between one large union and one employers￿federation.
The monetary target is given and credible. The timing of events is as follows: In stage one, wages
are set. In stage two, the central bank determines monetary policy. In stage three, production,
employment, consumption and prices are determined. The model is solved by backward induction
and the equilibrium is subgame perfect.
3.1 Production, consumption and employment
In the last stage, pro￿t-maximising ￿rms decide how much to produce and utility-maximising
households how much to consume. Both ￿rms and households take prices and wages as given.
4 Larsson (2007) shows that when perfect labour mobility is introduced in a similar setting, worker migration
o⁄sets the e⁄ects of the monetary regime and the neutrality of money is restored. However, in reality, labour mobility
is limited and the prediction that the monetary regime matters is likely to be empirically relevant.
43.1.1 Firms
Firms in each sector produce a homogeneous good with labour as the only input. A representative
￿rm in sector i maximises real pro￿ts ￿i by choosing employment Ni so as to:
max
Ni
￿i = (PiYi ￿ WiNi)=P; (1)
where Pi is the product price in the sector, Wi is the nominal wage in the sector, Yi is the output







where ￿i 2 (0;1). The ￿rst-order condition for pro￿t maximisation gives employment in a repre-







where ￿i = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿1 > 1 is the labour demand elasticity with respect to the real product wage,









where ￿i = ￿i=(1 ￿ ￿i) is the output elasticity with respect to the real product wage. Substituting











Real pro￿ts thus depend positively on the real consumption wage, Wi=P, and negatively on the
real product wage, Wi=Pi. The explanation for the former e⁄ect is that a rise in the consumption
wage at a constant product wage is equivalent to a rise in the real product price, Pi=P, which raises
pro￿ts.
3.1.2 Households
Households do not save but instead spend all their incomes. Preferences are Cobb-Douglas. A








5where Ci is consumption of good i, subject to
I=P = (PNCN + PTCT)=P;





wi for a worker employed in sector i
￿i for a capitalist in sector i
0 if unemployed,
where wi = Wi=P is the real consumption wage and ￿i is the real income from pro￿ts of a capitalist
in sector i. Solving the problem yields the household demand functions CN = ￿I=PN and CT =
(1￿￿)I=PT: Denoting aggregate income ~ I; aggregate demand for non-tradables ~ CN and aggregate
demand for tradables ~ CT , we obtain:














The budget share, ￿, of non-traded goods is a measure of the economy￿ s openness, so that when
￿ = 0 the economy is completely open with production of only tradables and when ￿ = 1 the
economy is completely closed with production of only non-tradables.
Tradables produced in di⁄erent countries are perfect substitutes and there exists a common
world market for them. This market determines a foreign-currency price of tradables, which by
way of the small-country assumption is exogenous to domestic producers. Aggregate output of
non-tradables is
R 1
0 YNdi = YN: Aggregate output of tradables is
R 1
0 YTdi = YT: Clearing of the
domestic market for non-tradables implies YN = ~ CN: It then follows that YT = ~ CT. To see this, use
the fact that the zero-savings assumption implies that nominal aggregate expenditure must equal
nominal aggregate income, i.e. PNYN + PTYT = PN ~ CN + PT ~ CT:
The production technology is the same in the two sectors, i.e. ￿N = ￿T ￿ ￿: Using the equality
between domestic supply and demand in both sectors, the demand functions (5) and the supply












The equation states that the relative price between non-tradables and tradables, PN=PT, is uniquely
determined by the relative wage between the sectors, WN=WT. Since the elasticity between the
relative price and the relative wage is ￿ < 1, an increase in the relative wage causes a less than
proportional increase in the relative price.
3.1.3 Employment
It is convenient to rewrite the labour demand equations in terms of real consumption wages. By
using the de￿nition of the aggregate price level (6) and the equation for the equilibrium relative























Equations (8) and (9) imply that employment in a sector depends negatively on the real consump-























Let E denote the nominal exchange rate in domestic currency per unit of foreign currency and let
P￿
T denote the exogenously given foreign-currency price of tradables.6 Since the law of one price
applies for tradables, we have PT = EP￿
T = E if we normalise the foreign-currency price to unity.
5 Note that (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ = [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ 1]=[1 ￿ ￿] < 0 and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ = [￿￿ ￿ 1]=[1 ￿ ￿] < 0.
6 One can think of the exchange rate as being endogenously determined by an interest rate parity condition:
R = R
￿ + (E
e ￿ E)=E, where R is the domestic interest rate, R
￿ is the foreign interest rate and E
e is the expected
exchange rate. By setting R, the central bank then determines E given R
￿ and E
e: We do not implicitly model
monetary policy, but the implicit assumption is thus that the central bank uses an interest rate instrument to
in￿ uence the exchange rate.



















































Taking logs and di⁄erentiating, (6) implies
dlnP = ￿dlnPN + (1 ￿ ￿)dlnPT: (11)
Under in￿ ation targeting, the central bank pursues monetary policy in such a way that dlnP = 0
always. Policy must thus induce such exchange rate changes that price changes for tradables exactly
o⁄set the e⁄ects on the CPI of price changes for non-tradables. More precisely, (11) implies that
dlnPT = ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿)dlnPN. In monetary union (with a ￿xed exchange rate) it simply holds that
dlnPT = 0:
Taking logs of the relative goods market equilibrium condition (7) and di⁄erentiating gives:
dlnPN ￿ dlnPT = ￿(dlnWN ￿ dlnWT): (12)
Together with (11), (12) determines the e⁄ects on prices that wage setters in the two sectors perceive
their wage decisions to have. These perceived e⁄ects will di⁄er depending on the monetary regime
and the bargaining arrangements. In Table 1, column (1) shows the perceived price elasticities under
in￿ ation targeting (I) and column (2) the elasticities under monetary union (M). The elasticities
are total elasticities, taking into account the possibility that a wage change in one sector may a⁄ect
the wage in the other sector.
84 Wage setting
In the ￿rst stage of the game, wages are set through bargaining between one union and one em-
ployers￿federation in each sector. The employers￿federation seeks to maximise the pro￿t of a
representative ￿rm in the sector. The union tries to maximise the rents from unionisation, i.e. the
excess of the utility of union members over the utility that would prevail in the absence of a union.
Jobs are randomly assigned among the workers in each sector. Li is the number of union members
per ￿rm in sector i. Workers are risk neutral so that the utility of an employed worker in sector i is
equal to the real consumption wage wi: The utility of an unemployed worker is b, which is taken as
exogenous. b can be thought of as the value of home production. Union utility in sector i is thus:
Vi = Niwi + (Li ￿ Ni)b ￿ Lib = Ni(wi ￿ b): (13)
The nominal wage Wi in sector i is set so as to maximise a weighted (geometric) average of the
utilities of the two parties, i.e. the optimisation problem is:
max
Wi




where ￿i is the relative bargaining power of the union in sector i. The maximisation is subject to
a set of constraints that di⁄er depending on the monetary regime and the bargaining set-up. Wage
setters realise that their wage decisions has a potential e⁄ect not only on the own product price

















Wj = f (Wi);
where index j denotes the other sector. Let ’i = 1 ￿ dlnPi=dlnWi denote the elasticity of the
real product wage, Wi=Pi, with respect to the nominal wage Wi and ￿i = 1 ￿ dlnP=dlnWi the
elasticity of the real consumption wage, Wi=P, with respect to the nominal wage.







+ (1 ￿ ￿i)[￿i ￿ ￿’i] = 0; (14)
where ￿Wi = @ ln￿i=@ lnWi throughout the paper. The condition states that the marginal gain for
the union from a wage increase must balance the marginal loss for the employers￿federation. The
marginal gain for the union is the di⁄erence between the utility gain from a higher real consumption




= [1 + ￿iMi]b; (15)
where Mi = ￿i=(￿’i ￿ ￿i). The real consumption wage in a sector is thus a positive mark-up on
the value of unemployment. The parameters ’i and ￿i depend on the monetary regime and the
wage-setting arrangement and will therefore determine how the equilibria di⁄er. Below we analyse
both a Nash equilibrium (uncoordinated bargaining) and the two possible Stackelberg equilibria
(pattern bargaining) with one of the sectors as leader and the other as follower.
4.1 The wage follower
It is instructive to ￿rst analyse wage behaviour of the follower in a Stackelberg game. The follower
takes the leader￿ s nominal wage as given. It thus acts in the same way as in a Nash game, when
each sector takes the nominal wage of the other sector as given. The assumption of a given money
wage in the other sector means that f0 = 0. Hence:
’i = 1 ￿ dlnPi=dlnWi = 1 ￿ @ lnPi=@ lnWi (16)
and
￿i = 1 ￿ dlnP=dlnWi = 1 ￿ @ lnP=@ lnWi (17)
in (15) when it applies to the follower in a Stackelberg game and to each sector in a Nash game.
4.2 The wage leader
Bargaining in the leader sector in a Stackelberg game also takes into account the response of the
follower, i.e. the leader internalises the impact of its wage decision on the wage of the follower.
10Table 2: Producer and consumer price e⁄ects under di⁄erent institutional settings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regime I I I M M M
Leader Nash N T Nash N T
Restrictions dlnWi
dlnWj = 0;8i dlnWN
dlnWT = 0 dlnWT
dlnWN = 0 dlnWi
dlnWj = 0;8i dlnWN
dlnWT = 0 dlnWT
dlnWN = 0
dlnPN
dlnWN (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿
1+￿￿ ￿
dlnPT
dlnWN ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 0 0 0
dlnP




dlnWT ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0 0 0
dlnPN
dlnWT ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
(1￿￿￿)
dlnP
dlnWT 0 0 0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿
(1￿￿￿)
Letting index i denote the leader and index j the follower, applying (15) to the leader gives:























When evaluating the price e⁄ects of an own wage increase, the leader thus takes into account that
prices are not only in￿ uenced by the direct e⁄ect of the wage increase but also by an indirect e⁄ect








i.e. the elasticity of the follower￿ s nominal wage with respect to the leader￿ s nominal wage equals
the elasticity of the CPI with respect to the leader￿ s nominal wage. This is the consequence of the
fact that for a given value of unemployment, b, (15) determines a unique real consumption wage,
Wi=P, for the follower in each regime.
4.3 Price elasticities under di⁄erent institutional conditions
To compare di⁄erent equilibria we develop the expressions in Table 1 for the perceived total price
elasticities under di⁄erent monetary regimes and bargaining arrangements. We do so by inserting
11the proper values of dlnWN=dlnWT and dlnWT=dlnWN. In a Nash equilibrium we set both
derivatives to zero. If sector i is wage leader, it internalises the impact it has on the follower sector
j according to (18) and we thus impose dlnWj=dlnWi = dlnP=dlnWi: The follower sector j, on
the other hand, takes Wi as given and we therefore impose the restriction dlnWi=dlnWj = 0 for
it.
In Table 2, columns (1)-(3) show the perceived price elasticities under in￿ ation targeting for
di⁄erent wage-setting assumptions. Column 1 applies to the Nash equilibrium, column 2 to the
Stackelberg equilibrium with the non-tradables sector as wage leader and column 3 to the Stackel-
berg equilibrium with the tradables sector as wage leader. Columns (4)-(6) show the corresponding
elasticities in monetary union.
It is useful to ￿rst give the intuition in the Nash equilibrium. Consider ￿rst in￿ ation targeting.
Then by de￿nition there are no consumer price e⁄ects, which implies that both dlnP=dlnWN and
dlnP=dlnWT are zero. The mechanisms are as follows. A wage increase in the tradables sector
causes a reduction in output in that sector, leading to lower aggregate income and lower demand
for non-tradables. The fall in demand puts downward pressure on the price of non-tradables. To
o⁄set the e⁄ect on the CPI, the central bank engineers an exchange rate depreciation, raising the
price of tradables.
A wage increase in the non-tradables sector generates upward pressure on the CPI. Hence, under
in￿ ation targeting the central bank engineers an exchange rate appreciation to counter this e⁄ect.
A wage increase in the non-tradables sector raises the price of non-tradables, whereas the price of
tradables falls.
In monetary union, the nominal exchange rate does not change. If the wage increases in the
tradables sector, the price of tradables is not a⁄ected, but output falls. This in turn leads to a
fall in aggregate income, which reduces the demand for non-tradables. As a result, both the price
of non-tradables and the CPI fall. A wage increase in the non-tradables sector causes a negative
supply shift in the sector, with the consequence that both the price of non-tradables and the CPI
rise.
How does pattern bargaining change the perceived elasticities? The consumer price e⁄ects un-
der in￿ ation targeting are still zero. But the table also shows that the perceived producer price
12elasticities under in￿ ation targeting are the same as in the Nash game. This is self-evident for a
wage change by the follower, who takes the money wage of the leader as given. The reason why the
perceived price elasticity is the same for the leader as well is that the e⁄ect of the leader￿ s wage on
the follower￿ s wage according to (18) goes via the CPI. Since the wage leader internalises the fact
that the central bank will prevent an own wage increase from raising the CPI, it realises that the
nominal wage of the follower will remain unchanged just as in the Nash game.
Under a ￿xed exchange rate, the bargaining arrangement does matter for the size of the price
elasticities. Consider ￿rst the case where the non-tradables sector is leader. An increase in the
N-sector wage raises the price of non-tradables and thus also the CPI. But the wage setters in the
non-tradables sector realise that this consumer price increase will cause the wage in the tradables
sector to increase by as much. As the tradables sector increases its wage, output in the sector falls
and thus also aggregate income. The associated fall in demand counteracts the rises in both the
price of non-tradables and the CPI. Hence, both the own producer price and the consumer price
e⁄ects of a wage rise in the non-tradables sector are perceived to be smaller when the sector is wage
leader than when wages are set simultaneously.
If the tradables sector is wage leader the mechanisms are as follows. A rise in WT causes a fall in
the output of tradables and thus in aggregate income. This reduces the demand for non-tradables
and causes their price to drop. The associated fall in the CPI leads to a decrease in the nominal
wage in the non-tradables sector, holding the real consumption wage there, WN=P, unchanged.
The nominal wage reduction in the N-sector ampli￿es the decreases in the price of non-tradables
and the CPI. Wage setters in the tradables sector will thus perceive larger falls in the price of
non-tradables and the CPI when they are wage leaders than when wages are set simultaneously.
4.4 Comparison of equilibria
We use (15) to compare the wage outcomes under di⁄erent bargaining set-ups and monetary
regimes. We focus on within-sector comparisons between monetary regimes and bargaining set-
ups, which implies that di⁄erences in the mark-up ￿iMi only depend on di⁄erences in Mi.7 So a
ranking of Mi (which will subsequently be referred to as the "mark-up factor") across regimes and
7 The rankings of real wages and employment across sectors in a given regime have been addressed by Vartiainen
(2002) and Holden (2003).
13Table 3: Wage mark-up factors under di⁄erent institutional settings
(1) (2) (3)





























bargaining arrangements is also a ranking of the corresponding real wages. By using the perceived
total price elasticities under di⁄erent conditions in Table 2, the mark-up factors in Table 3 are
obtained. Let superindex k = N;T;Nash indicate the Stackelberg equilibrium with sector N as
leader, the Stackelberg equilibrium with sector T as leader and the Nash equilibrium, respectively.
Multiple superindices indicate that the mark-up factor assumes the same value for the indicated
institutional settings. As before, subindex i = N;T indicates for which sector the mark-up factor
applies. Subindex m = I;M denotes the monetary regime.




iI for i = N;T: So, it does not matter what sector is leader
under pattern bargaining and this form of bargaining gives the same outcome as uncoordinated
bargaining.
This is an important conclusion as it implies - contrary to the presumption in the general
debate - that the bargaining set-up is irrelevant under in￿ ation targeting.8 The result is easy to
understand. The di⁄erence between a Nash and a Stackelberg game is that the leader in the latter
case takes the e⁄ect of its wage decision on the follower￿ s wage into account. But this e⁄ect goes
via the CPI: the follower￿ s nominal wage rises equiproportionally to the CPI increase so that the
real consumption wage is held constant. Under in￿ ation targeting this channel is cut o⁄, as the
8 This result hinges on the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences since this implies reaction functions according
to which the wage in a sector is independent of the wage in the other sector. This does not hold with CES preferences
which have been analysed by Vartiainen (2010).
14central bank prevents the CPI from changing. Hence, the central bank response implies that the
leader takes the follower￿ s nominal wage as constant also in the Stackelberg game. Each sector
thus faces the same optimisation problem when the game is Nash, when the sector is wage leader
in a Stackelberg game and when the sector is follower in a Stackelberg game. Hence the real
consumption wage in each sector is the same in all three cases. This implies that employment and
pro￿ts are also the same across alternative bargaining set-ups.
Proposition 2 In monetary union, the real consumption wage in a sector is the same when the
sector is wage follower in a Stackelberg game as in a Nash game, since M
j
iM = MNash
iM for i;j =
N;T, i 6= j:
The intuition is obvious, since the follower in the Stackelberg game solves the same optimisation
problem as the sector does in the Nash game. The equality of real consumption wages between
the two games does not, however, imply equality between nominal wages, as these will di⁄er to the
extent that the CPI levels di⁄er.9
Proposition 3 In monetary union, the real consumption wage in the non-tradables sector is lower
in the Stackelberg game when the sector is wage leader than in the Nash game as MNash
NM > MN
NM.
The Stackelberg game with the non-tradables sector as wage leader gives higher employment in both
sectors, and thus also higher aggregate employment, than the Nash game.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that MNash
NM > MN
NM is equivalent to (1 ￿ ￿￿)=￿￿ >
(1 ￿ ￿)=￿￿, which must hold as ￿ < 1.
When being wage leader, bargainers in the non-tradables sector know that if they raise the
wage, the resulting increase in the price of non-tradables dampens the rise in the real product wage
and thus the reductions in employment and pro￿ts in the sector. But they also realise that the
rise in the price of non-tradables, by pushing up the CPI, triggers a wage increase in the tradables
sector. As a consequence, output of tradables and aggregate income fall. This lowers the demand
for non-tradables and counteracts the rise in the price of non-tradables. This additional negative
producer price e⁄ect compared to the Nash equilibrium implies a larger rise in the real product
9See footnote 10.
15wage and hence a larger moderating in￿ uence on wages. The negative producer price e⁄ect also
triggers a fall in consumer prices that bene￿ts both employers and employees, but this e⁄ect is
smaller in magnitude than the disciplining producer price e⁄ect.10
The employment consequences follow from equations (8)-(9). As the real consumption wage
is lower in the (leader) non-tradables sector than in the Nash equilibrium (Proposition 3) and
the same in the (follower) tradables sector (Proposition 2), employment in both sectors must be
higher in the Stackelberg equilibrium with the non-tradables sector as wage leader than in the Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In monetary union, the real consumption wage in the tradables sector is higher in
the Stackelberg game when the sector is leader than in the Nash game as MT
TM > MNash
TM . The
Stackelberg game with the tradables sector as leader results in lower employment in both sectors
than in the Nash game.
Proof. It can be shown that MT
TM > MNash
TM if, and only if, (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)￿ > (1 + ￿￿)(1 ￿
￿)=￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿): This is equivalent to ￿￿ > ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿), which must hold since ￿ < 1.
In monetary union, there are no producer price e⁄ects that a⁄ect the wage decision in the
tradables sector, as the price of tradables is ￿xed. But there is a negative CPI e⁄ect from a
wage rise in the tradables sector that comes from the fall in output of tradables, and hence in
aggregate income, which causes a reduction in the demand for non-tradables. This negative CPI
e⁄ect strengthens the incentives for a high wage in the tradables sector in both the Nash and the
Stackelberg equilibrium, since it raises the purchasing power of the wage. But the incentive e⁄ect is
stronger in the latter case. The reason is that the reduction in the CPI causes a fall in the wage in
the non-tradables sector. This reduces consumer prices even more than in the Nash game. Hence,
since the negative CPI e⁄ect is ampli￿ed by the fall in non-tradables wages, the incentive for high
wages in the tradables sector is even stronger when the sector is leader under pattern bargaining
than in the Nash equilibrium.
10 As WN=P is lower in this case than in the Nash equilibrium and WT=P the same, it follows from the relative
market clearing equation that PN=PT is lower. With a given PT, PN and thus also P must be lower. It follows that
the nominal wage in the (follower) tradables sector WT is lower in the Stackelberg equilibrium with the non-tradables
sector as wage leader than in the Nash equilibrium. A similar reasoning shows that the nominal wage in the (follower)
non-tradables sector WN is higher in the Stackelberg equilibrium with the tradables sector as wage leader than in
the Nash equilibrium.
16Because the real consumption wage is higher in the (leader) tradables sector than in the Nash
equilibrium and the same in the (follower) non-tradables sector, it follows from (8) and (9) that
employment in both sectors is lower in the Stackelberg equilibrium with the tradables sector as
leader than in the Nash equilibrium.
The above results go against the conventional wisdom that under a ￿xed exchange rate (mone-
tary union) pattern bargaining with the tradables sector as leader promotes wage restraint and high
employment.11 Our conclusion is the reverse one: it is pattern bargaining with the non-tradables
sector as leader that is conducive to wage restraint and high employment in a ￿xed exchange-rate
regime.
The problem with the conventional wisdom is that it assumes that the direct wage-restraining
e⁄ect from foreign competition in the tradables sector dominates. Our model highlights instead
the importance of general-equilibrium interaction between the two sectors. The results can be
understood in terms of the relation between perceived changes in the real product wage and in
the real consumption wage. Optimisation by wage setters strikes a balance between the two. A
nominal wage hike is positive to the extent that it raises the real consumption wage (as both union
welfare and pro￿ts increase at a given real product wage), but it is negative to the extent that the
real product wage rises (as both employment and pro￿ts fall at a given real consumption wage).12
With a ￿xed exchange rate, a one percent increase of the wage in the tradables sector implies
also a one percent increase in the real product wage in the sector. Table 2 shows that the real
consumption wage in the sector rises by 1 ￿ dlnP=dlnWT = 1 + ￿￿ percent in the Nash case
and by 1 ￿ dlnP=dlnWT = 1 + ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿￿) percent in the Stackelberg case with the tradables
sector as leader. As ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿￿) > ￿￿, it is clear that there is a more favourable trade-o⁄ between
consumption and product wage increases in the Stackelberg than in the Nash case. This is what
creates the stronger incentive for wage rises when the tradables sector is leader. In a similar vein, it
can be shown that the balance between perceived consumption and product wage increases is less
favourable in the Stackelberg case with the non-tradables sector as leader than in the Nash case.
11 See, e.g., Calmfors (2008).
12 The importance of the relationship between the real product wage and the real consumption wage can be
illustrated by re-writing the ￿rst-order condition (14) as ￿i
h
wi￿i
(wi￿b) + 1 ￿ ￿i
i
￿￿’i = 0. The ￿rst term is the positive
e⁄ect on the weighted utility of the union and the employers￿federation of a one percent increase in the nominal








Figure 1: Union-perceived marginal utility of the real wage for an employed worker, ￿1 2 (0;1).
5 Wage setting with wage norms
A well-known feature of collective bargaining is the important role played by wage comparisons.
Under pattern bargaining the wage increases in the key sector often become a reference norm for
subsequent agreements. There is a strong tendency for wage increases in other sectors to follow
this norm closely. This section extends our analysis to account for this. It is done by incorporating
the Kahneman-Tversky (1979) concept of loss aversion in the way proposed by Bhaskar (1990),
according to which a larger weight is attached to losses relative to a reference norm than to gains.
5.1 Trade union utility
We now assume that the utility of an employed worker in sector i, as perceived by the union,
depends on both the real wage received and on a wage comparison norm, denoted wn:13 Following
Holden and Wulfsberg (2007), the assumption is that the perceived utility of an employed worker in
sector i is e wi = w
1+￿k
i =w￿k
n , where ￿k measures the importance of wage comparisons. In accordance
13 Our assumption is thus that comparison thinking in￿ uences the union utility function, which matters for wage
setting, but not the utility function of consumers, which determines the demand functions for goods.
18with the Kahneman-Tversky hypothesis of loss aversion, ￿k takes on di⁄erent values depending on
whether or not the wage exceeds the norm. More speci￿cally, we assume that wage comparisons
matter for union-perceived utility only when the wage is below the comparison norm, i.e.
￿k =
￿
￿1 > 0 when wi ￿ wn;
0 when wi > wn:
The union-perceived marginal utility of the real wage for an employed worker is thus a non-
di⁄erentiable function at wi = wn. It takes on a larger value for a wage immediately below than
for a wage immediately above the norm, as shown in Figure 1, since
@ e wi
@wi






We continue to assume that the union-perceived utility of an unemployed worker is the value of
home production b: For the union, wage comparisons play no role with regard to the unemployed.
Hence, the utility function for the union in sector i is now:











(19) is substituted for (13) in the weighted utility function to be maximised when the wage is set.
5.2 The wage follower
We assume that the real consumption wage in the leader sector serves as the reference norm for
the follower. As before we denote the leader by subindex i and the follower by subindex j. Hence,



































































i P ￿ b
￿ =
e wj (￿k + ￿j)























The discontinuity of the union utility function means there could be both an interior and a corner
solution. The interior solution is given by:
@ ln￿j
@Wj
= ￿Wj = ￿j
￿
￿￿’j +
e wj (￿k + ￿j)
(e wj ￿ b)
￿





Solving (20) for e wj; we obtain:
e wj =
h
1 + ￿j f Mj
i
b; (21)
where f Mj = (￿k + ￿j)=
￿
￿’j ￿ ￿j ￿ ￿j￿k
￿
: Equation (21) states that the union-perceived utility of
an employed worker is again a mark-up over the value of unemployment. Equivalently, equation
(21) can be written as an equation for the real consumption wage in sector j, which is homogenous
of degree one in the value of unemployment and the wage in the leader sector:
wj =
h








With an interior solution, the real wage in the follower sector is thus a mark-up on a weighted
geometric average of the value of unemployment and the wage norm set by the leader sector.


































Wj ￿ ￿Wj for wj ￿ wi and ￿+
Wj = ￿Wj for wj > wi: This means that when the weighted
gain to the bargaining parties of a wage increase is positive immediately below the wage wi set by
the leader, but negative immediately above this wage, it is optimal for the follower to choose the
same wage as the leader. This is a consequence of our loss aversion assumption.


























5.3 The wage leader
Since the wage comparison norm is the wage of the leader, the union-perceived utility of an employed




i = wi. It follows that
the trade union utility function is the same, as is the weighted utility function to be maximised in
the wage-setting process. The employment and price equations are also identical.
However, the maximisation problem of the leader is now more complex than in Section 4.1
because of the possibility of various types of equilibria for the follower. It is not enough for the
leader to maximise subject to the response function of the follower given the type of equilibrium for
the latter. The leader can also set its wage strategically to achieve the type of equilibrium (corner
solution or interior solutions for the follower) that gives it the highest utility.
We proceed as follows. First, we analyse potential equilibria with interior solutions for the
follower. Second, we analyse potential equilibria with corner solutions for the follower. Third, we
derive the actual equilibria that are realised.
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5.4 Potential equilibria with interior solutions for the follower












where ￿k = ￿1 > 0 applies for wj < wi and ￿k = ￿2 = 0 for wj > wi.
5.4.1 Interior solutions with a lower wage for the follower than for the leader
We ￿rst examine potential equilibria with interior solutions for the follower where wj < wi: The
real wage of the leader is still given by an equation of the same form as (15). The real wage of the










Assuming that ￿i = ￿j = ￿; it is obvious that an equilibrium with wj < wi requires that f Mj < Mi:
The mark-up factors under various institutional assumptions are given in Table 4. The condition
for a potential equilibrium with a lower wage for the follower than for the leader is that the ￿-term,
measuring the importance of wage comparisons, is below a critical value ￿, the magnitude of which
depends on the monetary regime and what sector is leader. Table 5 displays these critical values.
Under in￿ ation targeting, an equilibrium with a lower wage for the follower than the leader can
never come about if the leader sector is the larger one. If, for example, under in￿ ation targeting
the N-sector is leader and ￿ > 1
2, so that this sector is the larger one, the critical value is negative
22Table 6: Conditions for wj > wi in the case of an interior solution for the follower
Leader N T
In￿ ation targeting ￿ > 1
2 1 ￿ ￿ > 1
2
Monetary union ￿ > 1
2 1 ￿ ￿ > 1
2 + ￿2￿=2
(￿rst row, ￿rst column in the table). But since ￿ is always positive by assumption, it can never be
below this critical value.14
5.4.2 Interior solutions with a higher wage for the follower than for the leader
In the case of an interior solution with a higher wage for the leader than for the follower, (15) gives
the wages for both the leader and the follower. The mark-up factors are the same as in Table 3, as
￿2 = 0 when wj > wi implies that we are back to the case without comparison norms.
From Table 3, it is straightforward to derive under what conditions interior solutions with a
higher wage for the follower than the leader could occur. Table 6 shows that in three out of four
possible cases an equilibrium with a higher wage for the follower than for the leader can occur only
when the leader is the larger sector: the two in￿ ation-targeting cases and the monetary-union case
with the non-tradables sector as leader. In the monetary-union case with the tradables sector as
leader, it is not enough that this sector is the larger one for the follower (non-tradables) sector to set
the higher wage: the size of the leader (tradables) sector must be above a critical limit: 1
2 +￿2￿=2.
The intuition for the e⁄ect of size on the relative wage is that a larger leader sector has a stronger
incentive for wage moderation, as its wage rises induce larger e⁄ects on the rest of the economy,
which causes negative feedback e⁄ects on the own sector￿ s utility.
5.5 Possible equilibria with corner solutions for the follower
Next, we examine the possibility of an equilibrium with a corner solution for the follower where it
sets the same wage as the leader. Vartiainen (2010) has shown that a bargaining system where the
14 Similarily, if the tradables sector is wage leader and this sector is the larger, i.e. 1 ￿ ￿ >
1
2, then the critical
value is again negative (￿rst row, second column in Table 5).
23follower￿ s wage mimics the leader￿ s wage is conducive to high employment and high welfare under
the assumption of monopoly unions. The explanation is that the leader￿ s wage choice is disciplined
by the "irresponsibility" of the follower: because the leader knows that its wage will also be the
follower￿ s wage, it has a strong incentive for wage restraint. A natural question is whether such a
bene￿cial equilibrium can arise in our model.
To examine this, we solve the leader￿ s optimisation problem under the assumption that the
follower￿ s wage equals the leader￿ s wage, i.e. Wj = Wi: If we again assume that ￿i = ￿j = ￿,
we can compare the mark-up factors Mi after having inserted the proper total price elasticities
dlnPi=dlnWi and dlnP=dlnWi in the expressions for ￿i and ’i: It turns out that under this
assumption, the wage outcome for the leader is the same independent of monetary regime and




TM = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿.15
The described behaviour of the leader is an equilibrium behaviour only if the follower does
choose the corner solution perceived by the leader. This requires that ￿￿
Wj > 0 and ￿+
Wj < 0:16 We
show in the Appendix that at the wage chosen by the leader under the corner solution assumption,
wi = (1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)=￿)b; the second inequality never holds. Instead, it is always the case that
￿+
Wj > 0: This implies that the follower always chooses a higher wage than the leader in this case.
Hence, in our model there does not exist an equilibrium of the Vartiainen type where the leader sets
its wage by optimising against a response function for the follower according to which the latter
mimics the leader￿ s wage.
However, this does not rule out the existence of corner solutions. Indeed, such solutions may
exist. To ￿nd them, the following procedure is adopted. Consider, for example, a potential equi-
librium with an interior solution for the follower resulting in wj < wi; as analysed in Section 5.4.1.
15 The intuition for this result is simple. The leader would choose di⁄erent wages in the di⁄erent cases only if the
perceived total price elasticities dlnPi=dlnWi and dlnP=dlnWi di⁄er. If the relative wage between the two sectors
WN=WT is always unity, such di⁄erences can never arise. Instead, all total price elasticities are then zero. This
follows from the de￿nition of the CPI and the condition for relative market clearing in goods markets, i.e. from (6)
and (7). A constant relative wage between the two sectors holds the relative goods price PN=PT constant. With a
￿xed exchange rate (monetary union), PT is ￿xed. Hence also PN and therefore also the consumer price index P
are ￿xed. With in￿ ation targeting, P is held ￿xed by the central bank. This can be consistent with a ￿xed relative
price PN=PT only if PN and PT also remain ￿xed. Hence, a wage leader, believing that the wage follower will set the
same wage, will always perceive that there will be no price consequences of a wage change. This means that the wage
leader solves the same optimisation problem regardless of whether it is the tradables or the non-tradables sector that
is wage leader and regardless of the monetary regime.























Figure 2: The set of possible corner solutions
The leader could set its wage strategically so as to avoid ending up in such an equilibrium and
instead force the follower to choose a corner solution. This will be done if an equilibrium with a
corner solution for the follower gives the leader higher welfare than the equilibrium with the interior
solution.
To analyse the possibility of a corner solution, Figure 2 is helpful. Assume there is a potential
equilibrium with an interior solution for the follower where the leader sets the wage w0
i and the
follower sets the lower wage w0
j. The curve denoted ￿￿
Wj0 shows how ￿Wj depends on wj when
￿k = ￿1 > 0 and applies for wj < w0
i and wi = w0
i: The curve denoted ￿+
Wj shows how ￿Wj depends
on wj when ￿k = ￿2 = 0 and applies for wj > wi: The assumption ￿1 > ￿2 = 0 ensures that the
￿￿
Wj0-curve lies above the ￿+
Wj-curve. wi = w0
i and wj = w0




Assume now that the leader lowers is wage from wi
0. This shifts the ￿￿
Wj-curve downwards as
25￿￿
Wj depends positively on wi.17 wi could be lowered to wU
i at which point ￿￿
Wj = 0 (depicted by
the ￿￿
WjU-curve) at the same time as ￿+
Wj < 0 (depicted by the ￿+
Wj-curve). This represents an




Wj = 0 and ￿￿
WjL > 0. So, wL
i = wL
j < wi = wj < wU
i = wU
j all represent possible
equilibria with a corner solution for the follower.
To ￿nd out whether the realised equilibrium is one with an interior or a corner solution for the
follower, one has to calculate the (weighted) utility for the wage setters in the leader sector in the
various possible equilibria. The leader sets its wage strategically to reach the equilibrium which
provides it with the highest welfare. It is not possible to derive analytical solutions, so to explore
what equilibria will result we resort to numerical simulation.
6 Numerical solutions
The objective of our numerical analysis is to evaluate the e⁄ects of the choice of wage leader
for employment and welfare in the two monetary regimes when there is loss aversion. We are
particularly interested in the impact of relative sector size. To study the impact of wage norms we
compare equilibrium outcomes and welfare in the case with wage norms as described in Section 5
to the benchmark setting without wage norms as described in Section 4. We set ￿ = :8 to capture
decreasing returns to scale. We normalise b to one and make sure that the results yield reasonable
mark-ups on the value of unemployment.
6.1 Equilibrium without wage norms
Table 7 describes numerically the equilibria in the case without wage norms under di⁄erent as-
sumptions. Since the objective functions are continuous and di⁄erentiable under this assumption,
each regime-speci￿c equilibrium is unique. The uniqueness of equilibria made it possible to provide
an analytical ranking of real wages and employment as stated in Propositions 1-4. However, to





￿￿’j + f(￿1 + "j)=(1 ￿ b=e wj)g + (1 ￿ ￿)("j ￿ ￿’j)
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i ; it follows that
@￿
￿
Wj=@ e wj < 0 and @ e wj = @wi < 0: Hence @￿
￿
Wj=@wi > 0:
26Table 7: Equilibrium outcomes without wage norms, ￿N = ￿T = :5
Regime In￿ ation targeting Monetary union
Leader Nash Nash N N T T Nash Nash N N T T
￿ :25 :75 :25 :75 .25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
wN 1.500 1.167 1.500 1.167 1.500 1.167 3.000 1.333 1.500 1.167 3.000 1.333
wT 1.167 1.500 1.667 1.500 1.167 1.500 1.158 1.235 1.158 1.235 1.167 1.500
NN .123 .474 .123 .474 .123 .474 .031 .337 .126 .575 .031 .278
NT .474 .123 .474 .123 .474 .123 .244 .121 .488 .181 .237 .082
N .596 .596 .596 .596 .596 .596 .276 .458 .614 .756 .268 .360
the case without norms are computed for the sake of comparison. In all cases ￿N = ￿T = ￿ = :5
is assumed. Columns (1) to (6) display the results under in￿ ation targeting and columns (7) to
(12) the results under monetary union. For each regime, the ￿rst two columns show the Nash
equilibrium for ￿ = :25 and ￿ = :75, respectively, and the last four columns the corresponding
outcomes when one of the sectors is wage leader. Since the results illustrated in Table 7 are have
already been analysed qualitatively in Section 4 we do not comment on them further here.
6.2 Equilibrium with wage norms
Next, consider the case when the wage norm is set by the leader and the follower is loss averse.
Table 8 displays the equilibrium outcomes for ￿1 = :3: With this parameterisation, two of the
three di⁄erent types of equilibria may arise. We obtain either corner solution equilibria or interior
solution equilibria with a higher wage for the follower than for the leader. Regardless of regime,
corner solutions arise when the N-sector is wage leader and ￿ = :25 or when the T-sector is
wage leader and ￿ = :75: This suggests that corner solutions are more likely when the smaller
sector is wage leader. The corner-solution equilibria give higher aggregate employment than the
interior-solution equilibria. In these numerical examples, wage leadership for the smaller sector
thus promotes employment.
27Table 8: Equilibrium outcomes with wage norms, ￿N = ￿T = :5 and ￿1 = :3.
Regime In￿ ation targeting Monetary union
Leader N N T T N N T T
￿ :25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wN 1.167 1.167 1.500 1.167 1.158 1.167 3.000 1.333
wT 1.167 1.500 1.167 1.167 1.158 1.235 1.167 1.333
NN .203 .474 .123 .609 .211 .575 .031 .312
NT .609 .123 .474 .203 .632 .181 .237 .104
N .812 .596 .596 .812 .843 .756 .268 .416
￿N .045 .104 .053 .134 .045 .127 .038 .104
￿T .134 .053 .104 .045 .135 .049 .052 .035
Type of
equilibrium Corner wj > wi wj > wi Corner Corner wj > wi wj > wi Corner
Do wage setters in the two sectors agree on who should be leader? Under in￿ ation targeting
the answer is no. While (the larger) follower sector bene￿ts from the corner-solution equilibrium,
the smaller leader would prefer to be follower (and thereby achieve an interior solution where the
follower sets a higher wage than the leader). Suppose that ￿ = :25 so that the non-tradables sector
is smaller. When the N-sector is leader, as in column (1), it achieves a utility level of :045 and the
follower T-sector a utility level of :134. If instead the smaller T-sector is leader as in column (3),
this would give the N-sector a slightly higher utility of :053, but reduce the utility of the T-sector
to :104. In a monetary union, however, wage setters always agree on who should be wage leader
under this parameterisation. Regardless of which sector is larger, it is always optimal to have the
non-tradables sector as wage leader.
To analyse whether comparison thinking could be employment-promoting we compare Tables
7 and 8. We already showed that, for this parameterisation, the case with wage norms gives rise
to either corner solution equilibria or interior solution equilibria where the follower sets a higher
wage than the follower. But in the interior solution equilibria in Table 8 with a higher wage for
28Table 9: Equilibrium outcomes with wage norms, ￿N = :9;￿T = :1 and ￿1 = :3.
Regime In￿ ation targeting Monetary union
Leader N N T T N N T T
￿ :25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75 :25 :75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wN 1.532 1.279 1.100 1.033 1.532 1.279 1.400 1.067
wT 1.140 1.166 1.100 1.033 1.137 1.104 1.400 1.067
NN .126 .422 .272 1.117 .127 .446 .082 .953
NT .508 .154 .817 .372 .514 .172 .245 .318
N .634 .576 1.089 1.489 .641 .618 .327 1.271
Type of
equilibrium wj < wi wj < wi Corner Corner wj < wi wj < wi Corner Corner
the follower than the leader ￿2 = 0 by assumption. This implies that the wages set in these
interior equilibria coincide with the Stackelberg equilibria without wage norms, i.e. the solutions
displayed in Table 7. The only di⁄erence is that there may be corner solution equilibria in the
norm case if the smaller sector is leader. Since a comparison between Tables 7 and 8 show that
these corner solutions always yield better outcomes in terms of employment than the corresponding
Stackelberg equilibria without norms, comparison thinking could be employment-promoting. This
is an important conclusion, since it goes against the conventional wisdom that comparison thinking
leads to union militancy and employment losses.
6.3 Di⁄erences in bargaining power
Our analysis has questioned the conventional wisdom that wage leadership for the tradables sector
promotes wage restraint. A natural question is whether we have missed some important parts of
reality. One candidate is the assumption of equal relative bargaining strength in the two sectors
(￿N = ￿T) in the analysis of wage norms.18 A possible argument is that employers have a stronger
18This assumption was not made in the general analysis of wage setting without norms in Section 4.
29bargaining position in the tradables than in the non-tradables sector, because they have the option
of completely closing down domestic facilities and moving production abroad. To examine such a
possibility, we assume that ￿T = :1 and ￿N = :9 in Table 9.
We ￿nd four cases with corner solutions and four cases with interior solutions for the follower. In
three out of four cases (the exception is monetary union and ￿ = :25), leadership for the tradables
sector gives the highest employment. Strong bargaining power for employers in the tradables
sector implies an incentive for wage restraint which is transmitted to the non-tradables sector via
norm setting. The upshot is thus that leadership for the tradables sector may be conducive to
wage restraint if the di⁄erence in relative bargaining strength of the union and the employer side
between the two sectors is large enough.
7 Discussion
In many European economies one sector, usually a tradables (manufacturing) sector like engi-
neering, acts as wage leader and concludes the ￿rst agreement in a wage round, so-called pattern
bargaining. Recently, the wage leadership role of the tradables sector has been challenged by non-
tradables (service) sectors in many countries. Conventional wisdom holds that leadership for the
tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high employment. The argument is that inter-
national competition provides incentives for wage moderation in that sector which is transmitted
to the rest of the economy. We examined whether this is indeed the case in a standard model of a
small open economy and how outcomes depend on the monetary regime. Our surprising conclusion
is that it is hard to corroborate the conventional wisdom when one allows for general-equilibrium
interaction between the sectors. The analysis of the e⁄ects of various types of pattern bargaining
turns out quite complex.
First, assuming standard trade union utility functions, we ￿nd that under in￿ ation targeting
pattern bargaining gives the same outcome as uncoordinated bargaining. It does not matter which
sector is wage leader in this regime. In contrast, the type of bargaining does matter under mone-
tary union (a ￿xed exchange rate). But contrary to the conventional wisdom, pattern bargaining
with the tradables sector as leader gives less wage restraint and lower aggregate employment than
uncoordinated bargaining. Pattern bargaining with the non-tradables sector as leader gives more
30wage restraint and higher employment than uncoordinated bargaining.
Second, letting trade union utility depend on wage comparisons and introducing loss aversion,
we show the possibility of equilibria where the follower sets the same wage as the leader. This
could help explain the tendency towards uniform wage developments under pattern bargaining.
Such equilibria may arise when the smaller sector (independently of whether it is the tradables
or the non-tradables sector) is wage leader. They are associated with wage restraint and high
aggregate employment. So, contrary to what is usually believed, comparison thinking and loss
aversion may be bene￿cial for employment.
Would other assumptions than those in our basic model change the conclusions? One possibility
is that the bargaining strength of employers is greater in the tradables than in the non-tradables
sector, because production there can be shifted abroad. We show that the likelihood that wage
leadership for the tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high aggregate employment
increases under this assumption. However, it is not obvious that the relative bargaining power of
employers is greater in the tradables than in the non-tradables sector: a counterargument is that
the rate of unionisation is lower in the non-tradables than in the tradables sector.
Another caveat is that coordination in wage bargaining may be higher in the tradables sector,
which tends to be dominated by large corporations, than in the non-tradables sector, which is more
fragmented. More internalisation of adverse e⁄ects of high wages in the tradables sector might
therefore exercise more pressure for wage restraint there, which via wage leadership could spread
to the less coordinated non-tradables sector.
One simpli￿cation in our analysis is the assumption that the central bank pursues strict in￿ ation
targeting. An alternative assumption would be that the central bank instead pursues ￿ exible
in￿ ation targeting, i.e. acts to minimise a loss function with both in￿ ation and unemployment as
arguments. Such an assumption would break the equivalence between uncoordinated bargaining
and the two forms of pattern bargaining under in￿ ation targeting in the standard case without
norms. When leader, the non-tradables sector would realise that a wage hike causes a rise in both
the CPI and unemployment and that a central bank concerned also about employment would not
let the currency appreciate by the full amount required to stabilise the CPI. As a consequence, being
leader the non-tradables sector would expect a wage hike to result in a smaller increase in the real
31consumption wage than in our analysis, which provides an incentive for more wage restraint. The
analysis would change less with the tradables sector as leader since a wage rise there, by reducing
output and thus aggregate demand, tends to reduce both the CPI and employment. It is not clear
whether the anticipated monetary policy response would be more or less expansionary than in our
analysis.
The assumption that the tradables sector is a perfect price taker in the world market could
be relaxed. If domestic and foreign tradables are only imperfect substitutes, a wage hike in the
tradables sector would cause the price of domestic tradables to rise in the ￿xed exchange-rate case.
If the price rise were large enough, the CPI might no longer fall in the case without norms. When
being wage leader the tradables sector would then no longer expect an own wage rise to have the
bene￿cial e⁄ect of pushing down the wage in the non-tradables sector, inducing a further fall in the
CPI. This would lead to more wage restraint in the case with a tradables sector as leader under
a ￿xed exchange rate than in our analysis, but wage restraint is still likely to be greater with the
non-tradables sector as leader.
Finally, one could argue that we have treated wage comparisons asymmetrically by assuming
that the leader￿ s wage becomes the wage norm against which the follower evaluates its wage, whereas
the leader does not evaluate its wage against the follower￿ s. Our assumption captures the reality
that the ￿rst bargain in a wage round tends to become the comparison norm, but one could, of
course, conceive of comparisons with the follower being important for the leader, too. Such an
assumption would, however, increase the complexity of the model dramatically.
To conclude, a number of considerations could be added to our model. This might change the
conclusions. Still, we ￿nd it a puzzle that a straightforward analysis of pattern bargaining does not
support the conventional wisdom that wage leadership for the tradables (manufacturing) sector is
conducive to aggregate wage restraint and high employment.
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Under in￿ ation targeting and N-sector leadership:
￿TI = 1















Due to symmetry, the proof for the T-sector is analogous.
In a monetary union, under N-sector leadership:
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When the T-sector is wage leader in a monetary union:
￿NM = 1 ￿ ￿￿
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and the proposition follows.
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